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INTRODUCTION

During the Survey year, Illinois courts addressed various state
and local taxation issues, including the constitutionality of amendments to the Illinois Income Tax Act' and the Occupation and Use
Tax Act,2 the applicability of the Retailers' Occupation Tax Act to
* Partner, Keck, Mahin & Cate, Chicago, Illinois; B.S., 1967, University of Illinois;
J.D., 1970, University of Chicago.
** B.A., 1986, University of Illinois; J.D. candidate, 1989, Loyola University of
Chicago.
1. See infra notes 28-50 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 51-76 and accompanying text.
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foreign corporations, the role of injunctive relief in tax protesting

cases, 4 the applicability of the voluntary payment doctrine to tax
protesting, 5 the power of the City of Chicago to tax both airlines
using O'Hare airport 6 as well as amusements within the city limits, 7 and the constitutionality of Cook County's methodology for
assessing property tax.8 In addition to discussing these state court
decisions, this article will address a recent United States Supreme
Court decision that affirms important Illinois case law.9
II.

INCOME TAXATION

A. State Taxation of "Ginnie Maes" and Other Federally
Guaranteed Obligations
On November 10, 1986, the Illinois Supreme Court decided
Rockford Life Insurance Co. v. The Illinois Department of Revenue,' 0 and held that income received from obligations guaranteed
by the Government National Mortgage Association ("GNMA")
and similar institutions was subject to taxation by state and local
taxing bodies. " The plaintiff, Rockford Life, appealed this decision
to the United States Supreme Court. During the Survey period, the
United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Illinois
Supreme Court.
In Rockford Life, the plaintiff challenged the inclusion of its
"Ginnie Mae" type holdings as well as other similar federally guaranteed obligations as part of its corporate net assets. The assessed
value of these corporate assets determined the amount of annual
3. See infra notes 77-105 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 106-28 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 129-44 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 145-64 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 199-223 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 165-98 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 10-27 and accompanying text.
10. 112 Il. 2d 174, 492 N.E.2d 1278 (1986), aff'd, 107 S.Ct. 2312 (1987).
11. Id. at 187, 492 N.E.2d at 1284. A Ginnie Mae is a type of "instrument ... issued
by private financial institutions, which are obliged to make timely payment of the principal and interest as set forth in the certificate.. . ." Rockford Life Ins. Co. v. The Dep't of
Revenue, 107 S.Ct. at 2313. The unique feature of a Ginnie Mae is that in order to
attract investors, a government corporation known as the Government National Mortgage Association guarantees that such payments will be made if the issuer defaults. Id.
The following three types of obligations were at issue in Rockford: (1) Ginnie Maes;
(2) obligations guaranteed either under the New Communities Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C.
§ 3902 (1976)) or under the Urban Growth and New Community Development Act of
1970 (42 U.S.C. § 4514 (1982)); and (3) ship financing bonds guaranteed under the
Merchant Marine Act of 1936 (46 U.S.C. § 1273(a) (1976)). Rockford, 112 Il.2d at 177,
492 N.E.2d at 1279.
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state property tax paid by Rockford.' 2 Rockford argued that Ginnie Maes were federal obligations governed by federal law; and,
therefore, the income that they yielded was exempt from state and
local taxation.' 3 The United States Supreme Court faced the issue
of whether the interest from these Ginnie Maes is subject to state
taxation, or whether it was not taxable under the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity.' 4 The Court used a two-prong approach in its analysis.
First, the Court looked to the relevant statute that exempts all
federal obligations from state taxation., 5 The pertinent language is
as follows:
Except as otherwise provided by law, all stocks, bonds, Treasury
notes, and other obligations of the United States, shall be exempt
from taxation by or under State or municipal or local authority.
This exemption extends to every form of taxation that would require that either the obligations or the interest thereon, or both,
be considered, directly or indirectly, in the computation of the
tax, except [for estate, inheritance, or certain nonproperty]
taxes. 16
The Court indicated that the words "other obligations" refer only
to other "obligations or securities of the same type as those specifically enumerated" in the statute.' 7 Based upon this interpretation,
the court concluded that the Ginnie Mae certificates were fundamentally different from the types of obligations or securities enumerated in the statute.'8
The Court reasoned that the certificates were neither direct nor
certain obligations of the United States.' 9 In particular, the court
noted that the issuer bears the primary obligation to make the
monthly payments on the certificates; as a result, the government's
obligation was secondary and contingent. 20 The Court disagreed
12. Rockford Life, 107 S. Ct. at 2314.
13. Id.
14. Id. The doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity is codified at 31 U.S.C.
§ 3124(a)(1982). This codification expresses the constitutional mandate that state governments are prohibited from taxing the federal government in any way which has an adverse effect on the federal government's borrowing ability. Id.
15. Id.
16. 31 U.S.C. § 742 (1976). Title 31 was reformulated in 1982 and section 742 was
replaced in 1982 by Section 3124(a) without substantive change. The tax at issue was
levied prior to the recodification and, therefore, the pre-1982 statute technically controls
this case. Rockford Life, 107 S.Ct. at 2313.
17. Rockford Life, 107 S.Ct. at 2316 (citing Smith v. Davis, 323 U.S. 111, 117
-(1944)).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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with the taxpayer's argument that the government should be
deemed the obligor because the government is the holder's sole recourse in the case of default.2 ' The Court indicated that although
the government pays the holder of the certificate upon default by
the issuer, the issuer is nonetheless the primary obligor. 22
Secondly, the Court examined the constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity. The Court stated that usually an
instrument must meet certain requirements to be recognized as
constitutionally exempt from state and local taxation under this
doctrine.23 These requirements are that the instruments be in writing, bear some set interest rate, contain a "binding promise by the
United States to pay specified sums at specified dates," and be authorized by Congress.2 4 In the case of Ginnie Maes, the Court reasoned that the failure to fix an obligation by the United States was
critical and such obligations should, therefore, not be accorded immunity from taxation under the constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity. 25Accordingly, the Supreme Court held
that the indirect, contingent, and unliquidated promise that the
government is authorized to make, in the case of Ginnie Maes, is
not the type of federal obligation for which the constitution imposes an exemption from state taxation. 6
This decision adds little to the law on intergovernmental tax immunity. Justice Stevens, speaking for a unanimous court, stated
that the issue presented was not the type that would usually merit
the attention of the Court if presented in a petition for certiorari.
The issue had not divided the federal courts of appeal or state
21.

Id.

22.

Id. The Court also noted that "upon default, GNMA may ... institute a claim

against the issuer's fidelity bond or extinguish the issuer's interest in the underlying mortgages thereby making the mortgages the absolute property of GNMA. .. ." Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. (citing Smith v. Davis, 323 U.S. 111, 114-15 (1944)).
25. Id. at 2317. The Court indicated that the purpose of the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity "is based on the proposition that the borrowing power is an essential aspect of the Federal Government's authority and, [therefore it] bars the States from
taxing federal obligations in a manner which has an adverse effect on the [borrowing
ability of the United States]." Id. The Court stated that subjecting Ginnie Maes to state
and local taxation would in no way affect the borrowing power of the government. Id.
26. Id. The Court in Rockford also cited the concluding words in Smith v. Davis
that:
[A]II of these related statutes are a clear indication of an intent to immunize
from state taxation only the interest-bearing obligations of the United States
which are needed to secure credit to carry on the necessary functions of government. That intent ... should not be expanded or modified in any degree by the
judiciary.
Id. at 3217-18 (citing Smith, 323 U.S. 111, 119).
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courts, and aside from Illinois, no court had considered whether
Ginnie Maes were tax exempt. In other words, this case did not
present an overly important question of federal law.
The strong language used by the Court to affirm the tax, however, indicates the Court's wariness of having to consider this issue
again. The Court stressed also that the borrowing power of the
United States would be largely unaffected by taxing Ginnie Maes,
an essential aspect of the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity. The Court required something more substantial to act upon
than mere conjecture; the injury ought to be obvious and appreciable. There was no suggestion that "the federal fisc would at all
benefit from
a holding that Ginnie Maes are exempt from state
' 27
taxation.
B.

Constitutionalityof Amendment to Section 203(e)(2)(E) of
the Illinois Income Tax Act

During the Survey period, one of the most controversial cases
decided regarding income taxation was Searle Pharmaceuticals,
Inc. v. The Department of Revenue.28 In Searle, the Illinois
Supreme Court struck down a 1977 amendment to section
203(e)(2)(E) of the Illinois Income Tax Act. 29 Under the amendment, any corporation that was a member of an affiliated group of
corporations filing a consolidated federal income tax return, and
that incurred a net operating loss on a separate Illinois income tax
return basis, was deemed to have elected under the Internal Revenue Code (the "IRC") to relinquish the entire carryback period for
the loss. 30 As a result, the corporation was allowed only to carry
31
forward the loss.
27. Id. at 2317.
28. 117 Ill.
2d 454, 512 N.E.2d 1240 (1987), reh'g denied, Oct. 5, 1987.
29. Id. at 478, 512 N.E.2d at 1250-51. ILL. REV.STAT. ch. 120, para. 2-203(e)(2)(E)
(1979).
30. Searle, 117 Ill.
2d at 478, 512 N.E.2d at 1250-51.
31. Id. Under the IRC, a subsidiary corporation may join its parent corporation in
filing a single consolidated federal income tax return for a taxable year. Id. 26 U.S.C.
§ 1501 (1982). Once a subsidiary corporation elects to file such a consolidated return, it
must continue to do so unless it receives permission from the Internal Revenue Service to
discontinue such filing. Id. (citing 26 U.S.C. §§ 1501, 1502 (1982); Treas. Regs. § 1-150275(c) (1983)).
In Illinois, all corporations are taxed according to their net income for the "privilege of
earning or receiving income in or as a resident of this State." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120,
para. 2-201(a) (1979). Net income is calculated by taking the corporation's base income
that is allocable to Illinois, and deducting the standard allowable exemption. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 120, para. 2-202(a) (1979). Base income in Illinois is equal to the taxpayer's
federal taxable income, subject to certain modifications. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, para.
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The plaintiffs, certain subsidiary corporations, challenged the
amendment under the equal protection and uniformity clauses of
the Illinois Constitution.32 The plaintiffs contended that the
amendment to section 203(e)(2)(E) was unconstitutional because it
created an unreasonable classification which impermissibly discriminated for no rational reason. 3 The Department of Revenue
countered by setting forth a list of state interests which, in its opinion, sufficiently sustained the classification. 34 Both the trial and
appellate court upheld the mandatory election provision on the
grounds that a rational justification existed for the classification
and that the classification rationally related to legitimate state
interests.35
2-203(b)(l)-(2) (1979). (Taxable income is found on U.S. Form 1120, line 30). This taxable income figure, however, is difficult to determine if a subsidiary corporation has filed a
consolidated federal income tax return. Therefore, section 203(e)(2)(E) provides that
"taxable income [is] determined as if such corporation had filed a separate return for
federal income tax purposes. . . ." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, para. 2-203 (e)(2)(E) (1979)
(emphasis added). The amendment at issue, added to section 203(e)(2XE) in 1977, states
that for purposes of determining a corporate taxpayer's separate taxable income, it will be
treated as if that taxpayer has elected under section 172 of the Internal Revenue Code to
relinquish the entire carryback period and only carry forward any net operating loss incurred. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, para. 2-203(e)(2)(E) (1979). The effect of this
mandatory election is that only those subsidiary corporations which chose to file consolidated federal returns are adversely affected. Searle, 117 11. 2d at 459, 512 N.E.2d at 1242.
Conversely, those corporations that file separate federal returns are allowed the option of
carrying either forward or back any net operating loss sustained. Id.
32. Searle, 117 Ill. 2d at 462, 463-64, 512 N.E.2d at 1243, 1244. Although the plaintiffs challenged the amendment under the equal protection clause of the United States
Constitution, the court did not reach that issue in its decision. Id. at 462, 512 N.E.2d at
1244.
These plaintiffs were corporations that had elected to file consolidated returns and reported net operating losses for 1977 on their separate Illinois Corporate Tax Returns
(Form IL-1120). Id. at 460, 463, 512 N.E.2d at 1242-43. After filing their 1977 Illinois
Corporate Tax returns, the plaintiffs attempted to file amended Illinois returns for previous years, carrying back the loss sustained in 1977 and thereby requesting a refund for
the taxes paid in these previous years. Id. at 461, 463, 512 N.E.2d at 1242-44. The plaintiffs filed these amended returns pursuant to ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, paras. 5-506(b) and
9-911(b)(1) (1983). The Department of Revenue denied the requested refunds on the
grounds that the plaintiffs were deemed to have made the relinquishment election provided for in section 172 of the Internal Revenue Code. Id. at 461, 463, 512 N.E.2d at
1243-44.
33. Searle, 117 IIl. 2d at 464-65, 512 N.E.2d at 1244.
34. Id. at 465, 512 N.E.2d at 1244. See infra note 35 and accompanying text.
35. Searle, 117 Ill. 2d at 462-64, 512 N.E.2d at 1244-45. The appellate court in
Searle found "preserving appropriated financial resources, facilitating budgetary planning, aiding in administrative convenience, and preventing a corporate taxpayer's use of
the carryback election to reduce its Illinois taxes to a maximum extent" to be legitimate
state interests to which this amendmeut was rationally related. Id. at 462, 512 N.E.2d at
1243. Note, this case involved a consolidated appeal. One plaintiff, Caterpillar, was never
considered by the appellate court. Caterpillar took a direct appeal to the Illinois Supreme
Court. Id. at 464, 512 N.E.2d at 1244.
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The Supreme Court of Illinois held that there were no real and
substantial differences between those groups taxed and those not
taxed to support the legislature's classification and that the classification bore no reasonable relationship to the object of the legislation.36 Based upon the aforementioned, the court determined that
the amendment to section 230(e)(2)(E) violated the uniformity
provision of the Illinois Constitution, and, therefore, was invalid."
The court stated that the uniformity provision of the Illinois
Constitution, Article IX, section 1, is a specific limitation on the
states' power to tax. 38 The legislature did not enact it merely to
reiterate the general limitation imposed by equal protection as set
forth in Article IX, section 1.39 Rather, it was meant to give Illinois
taxpayers a higher degree of protection than the minimum standard of reasonableness afforded under the equal protection
clause. ° The court therefore concluded that because the Illinois
legislature is bound to protect the taxpayer beyond the minimum
standard as set forth in the equal protection clause when establishing tax classifications, it was improper to put the burden of proof
on the plaintiffs in this case to "negate every conceivable basis
which might uphold the classification. "41
The court stated that when judging the validity of nonproperty
tax classifications in Illinois, the added protection of the uniformity
clause must be considered. Accordingly, the proper test for making these determinations is whether "the classification ... [is]...
based on a real and substantial difference between the people taxed
and those not taxed, and ... [whether] ... the classification...
bear[s] some reasonable relationship to the object of the legislation
or to public policy. 42 In applying this test, the court first determined that no real and substantial difference existed between a corporation that elects to file a federal consolidated income tax return
36. Id. at 478, 512 N.E.2d at 1250.
37. Id. at 478, 512 N.E.2d at 1250-51.
38. Id. at 466-67, 512 N.E.2d at 1245.
39. Id. at 467, 512 N.E.2d at 1245. Article IX, section 1 states that "the General
Assembly may raise revenue except as limited or otherwise provided in this constitution."
See also 7 Record of the Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention 2062-66
(Report of the Committee on Revenue and Finance ***, Section I-State Revenue Power).
40. Searle, 117 Il. 2d 467-68, 512 N.E.2d at 1245-46.
41. Id. at 468, 512 N.E.2d at 1246.
42. Id. See Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Lenckos, 102 Ill. 2d 210,
464 N.E.2d 1064 (1984); Commercial Nat'l Bank v. City of Chicago, 89 Il1. 2d 45, 432
N.E.2d 227 (1982); Thorpe v. Mahin, 43 Ill. 2d 36, 250 N.E.2d 633 (1969); Fiorito v.
Jones, 39 Ill. 2d 531, 236 N.E.2d 698 (1968); Klein v. Hulman, 34 Ill. 2d 343, 215 N.E.2d
268 (1966); People ex. rel. Holland Coal Co. v. Isaacs, 22 11. 2d 477, 176 N.E.2d 889
(1961).
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as a member of an affiliated group and a corporation that does not
so elect as a member of an affiliated group.43
The court also concluded that the amendment bore no rational
relationship to the purpose of the legislation or to public policy."
The court examined the list of state interests advanced by the Department and decided that the interests, although legitimate, were
not effectively achieved by the amendment in question.45 Thus, the
43. Searle, 117 11. 2d at 467, 512 N.E.2d at 1246. The court gave a concrete example
of two corporations both of which are members of an affiliated corporate group, both
which incur identical losses, and whose Illinois tax returns therefore appear identical.
Under the amendment, however, there would be disparate treatment of these two corporations, based simply on the fact that one of them elected to file a consolidated federal
income tax return and the other did not. The court found that absolutely no rational
basis existed for this discriminatory classification. Id. at 477-78, 512 N.E.2d at 1250.
44. Id. at 469, 512 N.E.2d at 1246.
45. Id. at 472-77, 512 N.E.2d at 1247-50. The first objective advanced by the Department for the amendment was that the amendment was needed to clarify an ambiguity
created by the 1976 amendment to the Internal Revenue Code. Id. at 472, 512 N.E.2d at
1247. This 1976 amendment "authorized taxpayers to elect to carry the loss forward
instead of back, if the federal affiliated return elected a loss that loss would be carried
back unless the parent corporation elected to carry it forward and each member corporation would accordingly treat its share of the loss in the same manner on its State return."
Id. at 472-73, 512 N.E.2d at 1248. The court stated that this amendment does not address the problem because an ambiguity arises only when the affiliated group shows no
loss on the consolidated federal return, but a member corporation shows a loss on its
State return. The court went on to state that the construction the Department advanced
for the amendment did not work to clarify the ambiguity. Id. at 473, 512 N.E.2d at 1248.
The court rejected the Department's argument that the amendment was intended to
alleviate the burden of processing amended returns on the grounds that this was an "arbitrary means of reducing the [Department's] administrative burden." Id. at 474, 512
N.E.2d at 1248. Also, the court noted that the Department's objective was only partially
achieved. The Department still had to process amended returns for all of those subsidiary
corporations that did not elect to file a consolidated federal return. Id. at 474-75, 512
N.E.2d at 1248-49.
The court used the same rationale to dispose of the Department's argument that allowing corporations to file amended returns will force the state to pay refunds that were
not anticipated, or included in the budget. Id. Again, the court held that many corporations that are not restricted by this amendment, as well as many individuals, file claims
for refunds every year that can never be anticipated or included in the budget. IP. In
other words, the court reasoned that carrying the losses forward would not lessen the
budgetary problems.
The court next examined the Department's third objective for the amendment, that of
producing revenue for the state. The Department argued that in order to promote this
objective, the state must prohibit a corporate taxpayer, who is a member of an affiliated
group that files a consolidated federal return, from carrying back any loss in order to
reduce that corporation's Illinois income tax liability. Id. at 475, 512 N.E.2d at 1249.
Furthermore, the Department argued that allowing a taxpayer to file a consolidated federal return and subsequently allowing a member to carry back any losses sustained on his
state return would afford that member double benefits. Id. The court stated that there
was nothing wrong with a taxpayer choosing the tax options most advantageous to him.
Id. at 476, 512 N.E.2d at 1249.50. In the instant case, the taxpayer did not attempt any
prohibited practice that would afford it double benefits to which it was not entitled. It
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court held that the amendment violated the Illinois Constitution."
This was the first case in many years in which the court struck
down a state tax classification. Traditionally, tax classifications established by the state legislatures are given much deference.47
State legislative classifications are presumed valid and will be
struck down only if they are unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious. 48 Moreover, the burden of proof usually rests upon the person challenging the tax to show that no rational basis exists for the
classification.49
The direct impact of this case is minimal because the Illinois
legislature rescinded the discriminatory classification at issue in
1985.30 Searle, however, provides insight on the court's approach
to the classification issue. First, the court scrutinized the reasons
for the difference in tax treatment in order to focus upon the reasons that support the classification. In Searle, the disparate treatment resulted simply from the fact that the taxpayer elected to file
a consolidated federal income tax return. The court then examined
the basis for the classification to determine if there was some rational reason for subjecting one class of taxpayers to tax, yet exempting another class. Although the court could justify a decision
denying all taxpayers the right to carry back net operating losses,
no rational reason justified or warranted the denial of the right to
carry back losses for taxpayers electing to file consolidated returns.
All of the reasons given to support the disparate treatment would
have been equally applicable to the corporate taxpayer had it not
elected to file a consolidated return. There can be no question that
the Searle decision will be used by taxpayers to attack any classification situation that may arise in the future.
simply chose the available options that created the least tax liability for itself. Id. The
court reasoned that although the objective of producing revenue was a legitimate one, the
means used by the Department to achieve this objective were too arbitrary and capricious. Id. at 478, 512 N.E.2d at 1250.
46. Id. at 478, 512 N.E.2d at 1250. The court's decision in Searle only affects corporate taxpayers who chose to file consolidated federal tax returns between 1980 and 1986

because the amendment was rescinded in 1985. Id.
47. See infra note 65.
48. Springfield Rare Coin v. Johnson, 115 II1. 2d 221, 503 N.E.2d 300 (1986).
49. Searle, 117 Il. 2d at 465, 512 N.E.2d at 1245. (citing Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore
Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973); Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S.
522, 528 (1959); Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1939); Carmichael v. Southern
Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937)).
50. Searle, 117 Ill. 2d at 471, 512 N.E.2d at 1247.
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SALES TAXATION

Constitutionalityof Amendment to Occupation
and Use Tax Act

In 1984, the Illinois Legislature passed a bill amending the Illinois Occupation and Use Tax statutes. The legislation created an
exemption from occupation and use taxes for "legal tender, currency, medallions, or gold or silver coinage issued by the State of
Illinois, the government of the United States of America or the
government of any foreign country, except the Republic of South
Africa . .

.,51

As originally introduced in the Senate, the bill exempted "gold
and silver coins sold for investment or collection from State occupation and use taxes. '5 2 The bill's purpose focused upon putting
Illinois precious metal dealers on the same level as similar dealers
in other states already exempting these products from the two
taxes.53 Upon receiving the bill, however, the House adopted it
with an Amendment that excluded "gold coin or any of the other
enumerated items issued by the Republic of South Africa from the
exemption. ' 54 The debates that followed the return of the bill to
the Senate indicated that the main objective of the Amendment
was to discourage investment in South Africa. 55 The House also
56
amended the original bill to include a severability provision.
The Illinois Supreme Court addressed the validity of the 1984
amendment, under both the Illinois and United States Constitutions, in Springfield Rare Coin Galleries, Inc. v. Johnson.57 In
Springfield, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the amendment
was unconstitutional, but found the amendment to be severable
51.

Springfield Rare Coin v. Johnson, 115 Ill.
2d at 225,- 503 N.E.2d at 302 . (citing

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, para. 439.3 (1985) (Service Use Tax Act); ILL. REV. STAT. ch.

120, para. 441 (1985) (Retailers Occupation Tax Act)(emphasis added)).
52. Springfield, 115 Il.2d at 226, 503 N.E.2d at 302.
53, Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. The legislative debates indicated that the sole purpose for the severability
clause was assuring that this exclusion exemption would be severable from the rest of the
Act. The severability clause stated :
If any provision of this Act, or the application of any provision to any person or
circumstance, is held invalid, the invalidity of that provision or circumstance
shall not affect the other provisions of this Act or the application of that provision to persons or circumstances other than those as to which it is held invalid.
115 Il1.2d 237, 503 N.E.2d at 307 (quoting 83rd II1.Gen. Assem., House Proceedings,
June 22, 1984, at 59).
57. Springfield, 115 IU.2d 221, 503 N.E.2d 300 (1986).
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from the rest of the Act.58 In Springfield, the plaintiff, a retailer of
coins and related items, claimed that the South African Krugerrand comprised a lucrative part of its business and that the exclusion of such coins from the tax exemption adversely affected its
business.5 9 The plaintiff filed suit seeking equitable and declaratory
6 The circuit court held that the exclusion violated both the
relief.w
Illinois and the United States Constitutions. It concluded, however, that the exclusion exemption was severable from the remaining valid portion of the amendment. 6 ' The defendant took a direct

appeal to the Supreme Court.62
The court stated that the sole issue on appeal was "whether Illinois may impose a discriminatory tax on the sale of products of a
single foreign nation as an expression of disapproval of that nation's policies, and as a disincentive to investment in that nation's
products. ' 63 After establishing that the plaintiff had standing, and
that the issues in the case were not moot, the court arrived at the
crux of its analysis. 64
The court began its analysis by recognizing that legislative bodies traditionally have been given "broad discretion in establishing
58. Id. at 221, 503 N:E.2d at 300.
59. Id. at 227, 503 N.E.2d at 303.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 225, 227, 503 N.E.2d at 302, 303.
62. Id. at 226, 503 N.E.2d at 302. The plaintiff took the case up on direct appeal
pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 302(a)(1) (94 Ill. 2d R. 302(a)(1)).
63. Springfield, 115 Il1.2d at 227, 503 N.E. 2d at 303. It is also interesting to note
that during these proceedings, on October 1, 1985, the President of the United States
issued an executive order banning the "importation" of only South African Krugerrands
into the United States. This order applied only to Krugerrands and did not affect those
Krugerrands already in the country. Id.
64. Id. at 228-31, 503 N.E.2d at 303-04. The defendant argued that the plaintiff suffered no real injury because the plaintiff collected both the Use Tax and the Retailers'
Occupation Tax. Id. at 228, 503 N.E.2d at 303. Both taxes are levied at the same rate,
and "[t]o the extent that a retailer remits the amount of tax imposed by the Retailers'
Occupation Tax Act, he is not required to remit the tax collected by him under the Use
Tax Act." Id. at 228-29, 503 N.E.2d at 303. In other words, the defendants argued that
the plaintiff was able to reimburse himself, and therefore suffered no real economic injury.
The court rejected this argument by holding that the retailers are still principally liable
for the taxes. Id. at 229-30, 503 N.E.2d at 304. This liability extends to retailers whether
or not their customers pay their bills. Id. Therefore, the court reasoned that because the
taxes are levied on the retailer and because this exemption exclusion modified those taxes,
the plaintiff had standing to challenge the exclusion. Id. The defendant also contended
that the issues in the case were moot because of the executive order that had been issued.
Id. The court, however, rejected this argument on the grounds that the executive order
did not affect the Krugerrands already in the country, and if for some reason the President should lift his ban, the amendment at issue would stand as a direct impediment. Id.
at 230-31, 503 N.E.2d at 304. Therefore, the court held that the issues in this case were
not moot. Id. at 231, 503 N.E.2d at 304.
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tax classifications, and those classifications will withstand constitutional attack so long as they are reasonable." 6 The court stated,
however, that despite the broad discretion given to legislatures,
such discretion was not unbounded. 66 The "threshold requirement" for any tax classification scheme is that it must be established and predicated upon a "legitimate and permissible State
purpose.'67 The court indicated that the power to tax is a basic
attribute of state sovereignty and that this power to tax is "limited
only if in substance and effect it is the exertion of a different and a
forbidden power. ' 68 After setting forth these premises, the court
also recognized that the federal government's power to establish
and implement foreign policy is "plenary and exclusive. ' 69 The
court concluded that the apparent purpose behind the state law
was to express disapproval of investment in South Africa, and an
attempt by Illinois to exert power over foreign affairs.70 The court
observed that the need for uniformity within our national system of
foreign policy would be completely undermined if the states were
allowed to create inconsistent policies whenever they felt so compelled. 7 1 Therefore, the court held that the tax classification failed
in the face of the constitutional challenge because it was based
upon an invalid state objective .2
The defendant further argued that if the court found the exclusion exemption unconstitutional, then the entire amendment
should be held unconstitutional.73 The defendants contended that
the exclusion was not severable from the rest of the Act.74 The
court rejected this argument and pointed out that although both
the exclusion exemption and the severability clause were added to
the bill at the same time, the legislative debates revealed that the
65. Id. at 231, 503 N.E.2d at 305 (citing, Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co.,
410 U.S. 356 (1973); Williams v. City of Chicago, 66 Ill.
2d 423, 362 N.E.2d 1030 (1977);
Fiorito v. Jones, 39 I1. 2d 531, 236 N.E.2d 698 (1968). Article IX, section 2 of the
Illinois Constitution is as follows:
In any law classifying the subjects or objects of non-property taxes or fees, the
classes shall be reasonable and the subjects and objects within each class shall be
taxed uniformly. Exemptions, deductions, credits, refunds and other allowances
shall be reasonable.
ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 2.
66. Springfield, 115 11. 2d at 231, 503 N.E.2d at 305.
67. Id. at 232, 503 N.E.2d at 305.
68. Id. (quoting Bode v. Barrett, 344 U.S. 583, 585 (1953)).
69. Id. at 233, 503 N.E.2d at 305 (citing United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942)).
70. Id. at 236, 503 N.E.2d at 307.
71. Id. at 233, 503 N.E.2d at 305-06.
72. Id. at 237, 503 N.E.2d at 307.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 237-38, 503 N.E.2d at 307-08.
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exclusion exemption was intended to be severable. 7" Thus, the
court affirmed the judgment of the lower court, and held the exclusion to be unconstitutional, but severable from the rest of the Act.76
This case presented another decision based, in part, on the uniformity provision of the Illinois Constitution. The court's decision
was neither unusual nor unexpected, however, because the obvious
purpose of the questioned exclusion-to discourage investment in
South Africa- bore no relationship to Illinois tax or fiscal policy
and was clearly within the domain of the federal government.
Thus, unlike the decision in Searle, this case adds little to the law
involving the uniformity provision of the Illinois Constitution.
B.

Retailer's Occupation Tax Act's Applicability
to Foreign Corporations

During the Survey period, the Illinois Appellate Court for the
First District decided Bradford Exchange v. Department of Revenue77 in which the court upheld the imposition of the Retailer's
79
Occupation Tax Act ("ROTA") 7 upon a foreign corporation.
The plaintiff taxpayer in Bradford was a Swiss corporation, known
as Bradford Exchange A.G. ("Bradford"), which imported limited
edition collector's plates into the United States. 80 The taxpayer's
parent corporation, Bradford Exchange, Limited ("Limited")
solicited sales for the taxpayer from Illinois residents. Limited's
computer center, located in Morton Grove, Illinois, received and
processed the orders, collected payments and deposited the payments in Bradford's Chicago bank account. Bradford shipped the
plates to Illinois residents through Canada, either by mail or by a
common carrier."' In 1982, the Department of Revenue (the "Department") audited Bradford to determine its possible liability for
taxes under the ROTA. The Department, however,2 failed to serve
8
a notice of deficiency upon Bradford at that time.
In 1985, the Department audited Bradford for the second
time.
After this audit, the Department notified the taxpayer that it owed
taxes, interest, and penalties dating back to 1981, in the amount of
75. Id.
76. Id. at 238, 503 N.E.2d at 308.
77. 155 I1. App. 3d 674, 508 N.E.2d 316 (1st Dist. 1987), reh'g denied, May 21,
1987, cert. denied, 116 Il1. 2d 548, 515 N.E.2d 102 (1987).
78. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, para. 440 et. seq. (1985).
79. Id. at 686, 508 N.E.2d at 324.
80. Id. at 676, 508 N.E.2d at 317.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 677, 508 N.E.2d at 318.
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$518,439.23. The taxpayer paid this amount under protest, and
immediately filed suit in the circuit court seeking return of the
amount paid, as well as a declaration that such imposition of the
ROTA upon a foreign corporation violated the import-export
clause of the United States Constitution. 3 The circuit court based
its decision on the United States Supreme Court case of Michelin
Tire Corp. v. Wages, 4 and upheld the validity of the tax.85
On appeal, the plaintiffs asserted, inter alia, that the trial court
erred in not following the Illinois Supreme Court case of Miehle
PrintingPress & Manufacturing. Co. v. The Department of Revenue. 6 That case held that the imposition of the ROTA upon foreign corporations, in the business of importing foreign goods into
Illinois, violated the import-export clause of the United States
Constitution.8 7 The taxpayer also challenged the trial court's ret8
roactive application of the tax.
The court began its analysis by pointing to the fact that the major issue in the case pertained to the interpretation of a provision of
the United States Constitution. 9 Such interpretation is left to the
sole discretion of the United States Supreme Court; and, therefore,
whatever interpretation it may establish is "binding on every court
in the land."' 9 The United States Supreme Court made such an
interpretation in Michelin,"1 when it construed the purpose of the
import-export clause. 92 In Michelin, the United States Supreme
Court concluded that the framers had three basic purposes or concerns for enacting the import-export clause. 93 These three concerns were: the need for uniformity in regulating foreign
commerce; protecting one of the federal government's largest
sources of income from being diverted to the states; and preventing
the states from charging each other transit fees for the privilege of
83. Id. at 677-78, 508 N.E.2d at 318.
84. 423 U.S. 276 (1976).
85. Bradford, 155 Ill.
App. 3d at 676, 508 N.E.2d at 317.
86. 18 Il1. 2d 445, 164 N.E.2d 1 (1960).
87. Bradford, 155 Ill.
App. 3d at 678, 508 N.E.2d at 318.
88. Id. at 676, 508 N.E.2d at 317.
89. Id. at 680, 508 N.E.2d at 320.
90. Id. (citing People v. Loftus, 400 Ill.
432, 436, 81 N.E.2d 495, 499 (1948)).
91. 423 U.S. 276 (1976).
92. Id. at 285-86.
93. Id. First, the federal government needs uniformity and consistency in regulating
commerce with foreign nations. Therefore, if a state tax burdens this uniformity or is
inconsistent with federal foreign policy, it must fail. Id. Second, the federal government
receives a major portion of its revenues from taxing imports and, therefore, this source
should not be "diverted" to the states. Last, no state is allowed to charge another state a
transit fee for the simple privilege of passing goods through its boundaries. Id.
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passing through their borders. 94 Further, as long as a state tax did
not violate any of these concerns, it was not prohibited by the import-export clause. 95
Therefore, the Illinois appellate court found that although the
Illinois Supreme Court might have held differently prior to Michelin, once Michelin was handed down, the Illinois courts were
bound to follow the reasoning of Michelin.16 The trial court correctly disregarded the reasoning of the Illinois Supreme Court decision in Miehle,97 in favor of the reasoning in Michelin.98 In other
words, the "trial court properly applied the three-part Michelin
analysis to conclude that the retailers' occupation tax, imposed by
the Department, is not a constitutionally prohibited impost or duty
on imports." 99

Although the court held the imposition of ROTA on foreign
corporations such as the plaintiff to be constitutional, it disagreed
with the trial court's decision to give the tax retroactive application.100 The appellate court reasoned that the plaintiff justifiably
relied on Miehle as a valid statement of the existing law until it
received its notice of deficiency.' 0 ' Further, the court pointed out
that applying the tax retroactively would have the effect of forcing
the plaintiff to pay for taxes that it never collected from its customers. 0 2 To make the taxpayer pay these taxes out of its own pocket
would be inequitable. 103 Finally, the court pointed to an earlier
Illinois Supreme Court decision which held that if a decision overrules long standing precedent, it will ordinarily be applied prospectively in order to avoid inequitable results.10' Therefore, the court
94. Id. at 285-87.
95. Id. at 279.
96. Bradford, 155 I1. App. 3d at 680, 508 N.E.2d at 320.
97. 18 111. 2d 445, 164 N.E.2d 1 (1960).
98. Michelin, 423 U.S. 276 (1976) The plaintiffs brought their challenge subsequent
to 1976, therefore, the decision in Michelin controlled the Illinois courts on this issue. Id.
99. Bradford, 155 Ill. App. 3d at 682, 508 N.E.2d at 321.
100. Id. at 685-86, 508 N.E.2d at 323-24.
101. Id. at 686, 508 N.E.2d at 324.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 685-86, 508 N.E.2d at 324, (citing Board of Commissioners v. County of
DuPage, 103 I1. 2d 422, 427, 469 N.E.2d 1370, 1372 (1984)). The taxpayer appealed the
imposition of the tax on several grounds in addition to those mentioned in the text of the
article. The taxpayer advanced the argument that even if Michelin was the controlling
law, Michelin did not apply to goods still in transit. Id. at 680-81, 508 N.E.2d at 320. The
plaintiff argued that Michelin applied only to goods that had come to rest in an importer's
warehouse, while his plates were taxed in transit, before they ever arrived in Illinois. The
court rejected this argument by examining Michelin's definition of the words "in transit."
Id. at 681-82, 508 N.E.2d at 320-21. Michelin held that even nondiscriminatory property
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upheld the circuit court's decision that the tax was constitutional
but reversed that portion of the judgment which gave the tax retro0
active effect. 1
The Bradforddecision reinforces the principle that United States
constitutional considerations override state law considerations.
Having determined that the tax can withstand a constitutional attack based upon the United States Supreme Court's decision in
taxes might be prohibited if the goods are merely in transit, i.e., passing through the
borders of a state. Michelin, 423 U.S. at 290. Goods such as the plaintiff's plates, however, although taxed before entering Illinois, were not in transit under the definition of
Michelin merely because they were in the process of entering the state of their final destination. Bradford, 155 Ill. App. 3d at 682, 508 N.E.2d at 321. The taxpaye.r also challenged the imposition of the tax as being violative of the United States-Swiss tax treaty.
Id. at 683, 508 N.E.2d at 322. Article XVIII, § 3 of the treaty states that, "The citizens
of one of the contracting States shall not, while resident in the other contracting State, be
subjected therein to other or more burdensome taxes than are the citizens of such other
contracting State residing in its territory." Convention between the United States of
America and the Swiss Confederation for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income, May 24, 1951, 2 U.S.T. 1751, T.I.A.S., No-2316. The taxpayer interpreted this provision to prohibit the United States from taxing him more than
Switzerland would tax a U.S. citizen in his position who resided in Switzerland. Bradford,
155 Il. App. 3d at 683, 508 N.E.2d at 322. The court, however, found the taxpayer's
interpretation misplaced. The court stated that the correct interpretation of the section
prohibits the United States from taxing Swiss residents residing in the United States more
heavily than its own U.S. citizens. Id. The court reasoned that the plain meaning of the
provision was to prevent the discriminatory taxing of citizens of Switzerland living in the
United States, and found that the tax in question (ROTA) was not such a discriminatory
tax. Id.
The taxpayer contended also that the Department's imposition of "ROTA on a foreign
corporation violates the foreign commerce clause of the United States Constitution ..."
(U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.) Id. at 683, 508 N.E.2d at 322. The court rejected this
argument by stating that "where the a State seeks to tax the instrumentalities of foreign
as opposed to interstate commerce, [there are] two ...considerations... which must be
considered: the enhanced risk of multiple taxation and the need for the Federal government to speak with one voice when regulating commerce with foreign nations. Id. at 684,
508 N.E.2d at 322 (citing Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434
(1979)). Applying these considerations to the tax at issue, the court reasoned that imposition of ROTA on the plaintiff did not enhance the risk that the plaintiff would be subject to multiple taxation by both Switzerland and Illinois. Bradford, 155 Il1.App. 3d at
864-85, 508 N.E.2d at 323. The court based this reasoning on the fact that the tax was
imposed only on gross receipts of the taxpayer's Illinois sales. Further, the court found
the imposition of the tax not to be an obstacle to the federal government's ability to
regulate commerce. Therefore, the court held that the imposition of the ROTA to the
plaintiff did not violate the commerce clause of the United States Constitution. Id. Finally, the taxpayer advanced th,- argument that "there is no statutory basis for the application of ROTA to its activities because there are no facts showing a sales or acceptance
in Illinois." Id. at 685, 508 N.E.2d at 323. The court summarily dismissed this argument
by stating that the plaintiff's failure to raise this issue at the trial court level precluded it
from now raising it for the first time on appeal. Id.
App. 3d at 686, 508 N.E.2d at 324.
105. Bradford, 155 Ill.
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Michelin, any stricter constitutional test imposed by Illinois, even
if it would bar taxation, must fall.
IV. TAX PROTESTING
A. Property Tax: Injunctive Relief
In Schlenz v. Castle,'1 the Illinois Supreme Court held that injunctive relief is not a proper remedy when numerous administrative and legal remedies are available to plaintiffs who are
challenging their property tax assessments. 0 7 In Schlenz, the
plaintiffs filed their complaint in 1978, alleging, inter alia, that
Lake County officials systematically under-assessed certain types
of property and erroneously granted tax exempt status to others.108
The plaintiffs claimed that these actions by local officials resulted
in their being charged a higher tax rate.'°9 Therefore, they sought
injunctive and declaratory relief against the defendants.110 The circuit court dismissed the complaint, and the appellate court
affirmed. "',
The main issue before the court was whether the plaintiffs were
entitled to injunctive or declaratory relief, or alternatively whether
such relief was properly denied on the grounds that an adequate
legal remedy existed." 2 The Illinois Supreme Court3 held that the
plaintiffs were not entitled to the requested relief."
The court agreed with the defendants' argument that an adequate legal remedy existed via either administrative review or tax
protesting, the procedure whereby the taxpayer pays his taxes
under protest and files objection in the circuit court."14 The defendants contended that although under-assessment is recognized
as a valid objection to tax cases, the traditional remedy available
has been a refund of the amount the challenger would not have
106. 115 Ill. 2d 135, 503 N.E.2d 241 (1986), reh'g denied, Jan. 30, 1987.
107. Id. at 142, 503 N.E.2d at 244.
108. Id. at 141,503 N.E.2d at 243.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 139, 503 N.E.2d at 242.
111. Id. at 138, 503 N.E.2d at 242.
112. Id. at 139, 503 N.E.2d at 242.
113. Id. at 145, 503 N.E.2d at 245.
114. Id. at 142, 503 N.E.2d at 244. In order to overcome the bar against equitable
relief when an adequate remedy at law exists, a complaint must allege either that the tax
is unauthorized by law or that such tax is imposed on exempt property. Id. at 141, 503
N.E.2d at 242 (citing First National Bank & Trust Co. v. Rosewell, 93 Ill. 2d 388, 392,
444 N.E.2d 126, 128-29 (1982)).
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paid had the assessment been correct."' The plaintiffs argued
against the adequacy of the available legal remedies.' " 6 They contended that none of the
options permitted them to join county offi7
cials as defendants."
The court reasoned that the essence of the plaintiffs' argument
was an attempt to force the local officials to raise assessments of
certain types of property and repeal exemption status afforded to
others." The court stated that lack of joinder of the county officials did not make the legal remedy inadequate." 9 The court
looked at each of the taxpayers claims of alleged misconduct by the
defendants separately. With regard to the under-assessment, the
court stated that "[w]hat plaintiffs fail to face is that their only
stake in the under-assessment of other types of property is its effect
on their taxes; their inability to force the assessment officials to
increase other assessments does not
render the tax-objection pro20
ceeding an inadequate remedy."'
Next, the court turned to the plaintiffs' challenge to certain tax
exempt properties in the county. The court concluded that
although the plaintiffs challenged the exemption status of several
parcels of property, they failed to supply an adequate description
of any one of them.' 2 ' The court also indicated that the relief re22
quested by the plaintiffs was "so vague as to be meaningless."'1
The court stated that a "private citizen has no authority to bring a
suit for the collection of taxes"'' 23 and that permitting citizens to
challenge their neighbor's exemption status "would turn them into
defacto special assistant State's Attorneys and would lead to chaos
and confusion."'' 24 Therefore, the court held that the plaintiffs
were not entitled to injunctive or declaratory relief in either of their
25
claims because various adequate legal remedies were available.
26
court.
appellate
the
of
decision
the
Consequently, it affirmed
The impact of this case is questionable. The court notes that
115. Id. at 142, 503 N.E.2d at 244 (citing People ex. rel Kohorst v. Golf, Mobile &
Ohio R.R. Co., 22 Ill. 2d 104, 174 N.E.2d 182 (1961)).
116. Id. at 143, 503 N.E.2d at 244.
117. Id. at 144, 503 N.E.2d at 245.
118. Id. at 143-44, 503 N.E.2d at 244-45.
119. Id. at 143, 503 N.E.2d at 244.

120. Id.
121.

122.
123.
(1948)).
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 144, 503 N.E.2d at 245.

Id.
Id. (citing People ex rel Morse v. Chambliss, 399 Ill. 151, 77 N.E.2d 191
Id.
Id. at 143, 503 N.E.2d at 244.
Id. at 145, 503 N.E.2d at 245.
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"[t]his action represents the latest salvo in a war which plaintiffs'
counsel, Paul Hamer, has waged against revenue officials in this
State over more than two decades."' 27 The court had difficulty determining from the face of the complaint just what irregularities
were alleged and what relief was being sought. 12 In light of the
history of the plaintiff's counsel and the inability to clearly set
forth the errors committed and relief sought, the decision was not
unexpected.
B.

Voluntary Payment Doctrine: Bar to Recovery

It is a general rule that if taxes are paid without protest, such
taxes may not be recovered without statutory authorization, even

though a court later determines that those taxes were wrongly col-

lected.129 This concept is known as the voluntary payment doctrine. 30 Protest may be excused under certain circumstances. For
example, if it is shown that the plaintiff taxpayer did not have adequate knowledge of the facts upon which to frame a protest or if
the payments were made under3 duress or compulsion, protest is
not a prerequisite to recovery.' '
In Freund v. Avis Rent-A-Car System, Inc.,132 the Illinois
Supreme Court held that the voluntary payment doctrine barred
127. Id. at 138, 503 N.E.2d at 242.
128. Id. at 139-40, 503 N.E.2d at 242-43.
129. Freund v. Avis Rent-A-Car System Inc., 114 I1. 2d 73, 79, 499 N.E.2d 473, 475
(citing Getto v. City of Chicago, 86 Ill.
2d 39, 48, 426 N.E.2d 844, 849 (1981); Hagerty v.
General Motors Corp., 59 Ill.
2d 52, 59, 319 N.E.2d 5, 8 (1974)).
130. Freund, 114 Ill.
2d at 74, 499 N.E.2d at 475. The voluntary payment doctrine
has been described as follows:
It has been a universally recognized rule that money voluntarily paid under a
claim of right to the payment and with knowledge of the facts by the person
making the payment cannot be recovered back on the ground that the claim was
illegal. It has been deemed necessary not only to show that the claim asserted
was unlawful, but also that the payment was not voluntary; that there was some
necessity which amounted to compulsion, and payment was made under the
influence of such compulsion.
Freund, 114 Ill. 2d at 79, 499 N.E.2d at 473 (quoting Illinois Glass Co. v. Chicago Telephone Co., 234 Ill.
535, 541 (1908)).
131. Freund, 114 Ill.
2d at 80, 499 N.E.2d at 475 (citing Getto v. City of Chicago, 86
Ill. 2d 39, 426 N.E.2d 844 (1981)). The plaintiffs relied on Getto to support their argument that their failure to protest the taxes should be excused. Id. at 80, 499 N.E.2d at
475-76. The court, however, distinguished Getto on the grounds that it involved recovery
for invalid amounts of a municipal message tax included in telephone bills for phone
service, where the bills showed only lump sums for the various taxes and disclosed
neither the rates nor the items on which the taxes were imposed. Id. at 81, 499 N.E.2d at
476-77. The court stated that the forms at issue in Freund sufficiently showed the tax rate
and the items being taxed. Id. at 83, 499 N.E.2d at 477.
132. Freund, 114 Ill.
2d 73, 499 N.E.2d 473 (1986).
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relief if the complaining party had adequate knowledge of the alleged excessive charges upon which to base a protest at the time of
payment. 133 In Freund, the plaintiffs rented cars from the defendant rental car companies. Upon returning the cars, the defendants
presented each of the plaintiffs with a rental agreement that delineated all of the charges. 134 Each of the plaintiffs
paid the amounts
1 35
listed on these agreements without protest.
On October 6, 1982, the plaintiffs filed a class action suit against
the defendants, Avis Rent-A-Car and Hertz Corporation.1 36 In
their complaint, the plaintiffs indicated that the base upon which
their rental taxes were calculated included a cost of a collision
damage waiver. The plaintiffs asserted that the taxes should have
been imposed on the rental charges alone. The complaint also alleged that the agencies used a state tax rate of six percent instead of
the appropriate rate of five percent.' 37 The plaintiffs contended that
the rental agreements were complicated, vague, and did not sufficiently reveal the costs of the collision damage waiver and the
methods of calculating charges. Consequently, the plaintiffs maintained that they lacked sufficient information upon which to base a

protest. 138
The trial court dismissed the action indicating that the voluntary
139
payment doctrine barred recovery. The appellate court affirmed.
The single issue before the Illinois Supreme Court was whether the
plaintiffs' payments were made voluntarily.'"4 The court disagreed
with the plaintiffs' contention that the defendant's forms should
have identified the particular taxes as well as show their rates and
computation bases.14' It concluded that the forms used by the defendants clearly set forth the items taxed and the tax rate. 142 That
is, the court found that the forms provided "sufficient information
such that protests were not excused."'' 4 3 Accordingly, the court affirmed the appellate court decision and held that the plaintiffs did
133.
134.
135,
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
N.E.2d
N.E.2d

Id. at 83, 499 N.E.2d at 477.
Id. at 76, 499 N.E.2d at 474.
Id.
Id. at 75.76, 499 N.E.2d at 473-74.
Id. at 76-77, 499 N.E.2d at 474.
Id. at 80, 499 N.E.2d at 475.
Id. at 78, 499 N.E.2d at 475.
Id. at 79, 499 N.E.2d at 475.
Id. at 82, 499 N.E.2d at 476.
Id. at 83, 499 N.E.2d at 477.
Id. (citing Lusinski v. Dominick's Finer Foods, Inc., 136 Ill. App. 3d 640, 483
at 587 (1st Dist. 1985); Isberian v. Village of Gurnee, 116 Ill.
App. 3d 146, 452
at 10 (1st Dist. 1983)).
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not fall outside of the scope of the voluntary payment doctrine; and
absent protest, their cause of action was properly dismissed."
V.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXING POWERS

A. Chicago Vehicle Fuel Tax
In United Airlines,Inc. v. City of Chicago,1 45 the Illinois Suprere
Court held that the city's general sales and use tax, when applied
to flight fuel, did not unconstitutionally impair or breach the city's
agreement with the plaintiffs. The agreement provided that the airline shall not be required to pay any additional charges for the
privilege of using materials purchased by the airlines, or for the
purposes provided for in the contract.1 46 The court felt the langua, - of the agreement did not apply to exclude taxes of general
4
apr icability.1 1
The agreement in question, known as the Chicago-O'Hare International Airport Use Agreement and. Terminal Facilities Lease
(the "Agreement"), was a contract between the city and the airlines governing the airlines' use of O'Hare.148 The Agreement
states in relevant part:
Except as in this Agreement otherwise specifically provided, no
charges, fees or tolls of any nature, direct or indirect, shall be
imposed by [the] City upon [the airline signatories] for the privilege of purchasing, selling or using for a purpose herein permitted any materials or services purchased or otherwise obtained by
[the airline signatories]. The foregoing shall not *** preclude
[the] City from imposing any tax, charge, or permit or license fee
not inconsistent with the rights and privileges granted to the [airline signatories] hereunder. Notwithstanding the foregoing,
nothing in this Section 3.04 shall be deemed to permit [the] City
to levy, or preclude [the] City from levying, a passenger facility
charge or other similar tax at the Airport. 49
On September 24, 1986, the city enacted the Chicago Vehicle
Fuel Tax Ordinance imposing a tax of five cents per gallon on vehicle fuel purchased either at retail within the city or purchased for
retail outside the city but used in the city.1 50 n response, the plain144. Freund, 114 I1. 2d at 83, 499 N.E.2d at 478.
145. 116 Ill. 2d 311, 507 N.E.2d 858 (1987).
146. Id. at 322-23, 507 N.E.2d at 863.
147. Id. at 319, 507 N.E.2d at 861.
148. Id. at 314, 507 N.E.2d at 859.
149. Id. at 317, 507 N.E.2d at 860.
150. Id. at 313, 507 N.E.2d at 859. "Vehicle fuel includes all fuel used to propel cars,
trucks, buses, trains... airplanes and helicopters." Id. Also, on January 1, 1986, the city
had repealed an exemption for jet fuel purchased outside of Illinois at retail, thereby
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tiffs sought both injunctive and declaratory relief on the grounds
that the tax violated the rights and duties set forth in the Agreement. ' The circuit court held that the imposition of the tax unconstitutionally impaired the Agreement and granted summary
judgement in favor of the plaintiffs. 5 2 The City filed a direct appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court." 3
On appeal, the single issue was whether a tax of general applicability, such as the vehicle fuel tax, constituted a "charge" when
imposed upon the airlines, and thereby breached the terms of the
Agreement. 54 The plaintiffs contended that a "tax" necessarily
constitutes a "charge" and that aviation fuel is a "material" and
therefore, under section 304(b) of the Agreement, the plaintiffs
could not be subject to the fuel use tax. 55
The Illinois Supreme Court focused on the express language of
the Agreement. The court attempted to construe the contract in
the mo- t reasonable and fair way in order to reflect the intention of
the parties. 5 6 The court construed the contract in its entirety and
determined that although a tax is a charge in the abstract, the language prohibiting charges did not preclude the city from levying a
tax of general application.15 7 The court bolstered its position by
noting the use of the words "charge" and "tax" within the text of
the Agreement itself. 58s The court noted that the words "rentals,
fees and charges" were used repeatedly throughout the contract in
exposing airlines to an additional one percent use tax under the Chicago Sales Tax Ordinance. Id. The plaintiffs challenged both taxes. Id. at 314, 507 N.E.2d at 859. The
court's analysis, however, can be applied to both taxes and therefore only the fuel tax is
referred to in the body of the article. Id.
151. Id. at 315, 507 N.E.2d at 859. On appeal, the court consolidated a very similar
suit, filed by Midway Airlines, Inc. The language in the Midway Use Agreement was
strikingly similar to that used in the O'Hare Use Agreement, so much so that Midway
relied on O'Hare's memorandum and oral argument at the hearing for summary judgment and on O'Hare's brief arguments on appeal. Id. at 315-16, 507 N.E.2d at 859-60.
Therefore, the references to plaintiffs, plural, includes both Midway and the O'Hare airlines. Note, at the circuit court level, there were also two other plaintiffs challenging the
taxes. Id. at 314, 507 N.E.2d at 859. These plaintiffs were non-airline gas-distributor
groups. Id. The circuit couit, however, granted summary judgments in favor of the city
with respect to these plaintiffs. Id. at 315, 507 N.E.2d at 859.
152. Id. at 315, 507 N.E.2d at 859. Note, the court granted summary judgment to the
city on the plaintiffs' claim that the vehicle fuel tax violated due process.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 319, 507 N.E.2d at 861.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 318, 507 N.E.2d at 861 (citing Shelton v. Andres, 106 I1. 2d 153, 159, 478
N.E.2d 311, 314 (1985); Schek v. Chicago Transit Authority, 42 Il1. 2d 362, 364, 247
N.E.2d 886, 887 (1969)).
157. United, 116 Ill. 2d at 319, 507 N.E.2d at 861.
158. Id. at 319-21, 507 N.E.2d at 861-62.
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clauses which referred to the payments that the airlines were required to make in order to conduct activities at the airport. 5 9 The
word "tax" was conspicuously absent from these provisions, and
was, in fact, "used in all but one instance in sections [of the agree'16
ment] which acknowledge the city's right to impose taxes."
Moreover, the court looked to the specific language of section
304(b) of the Agreement. The court maintained that although the
second sentence of section 304(b) prohibited the city from imposing "charges, fees or tolls" on "any materials or services," the next
sentence provided that it "shall not . . . preclude the City from
imposing any tax, charge, or permit or license fee. . . ." 16 Therefore, the court construed section 304(b) as a whole and concluded
that the sentence explicitly permitting taxes qualified the general
1 62
proscription of charges, fees, or tolls.
Based upon this analysis, the court concluded that the parties
did not intend to prohibit the imposition of a general tax on aviation fuel.1 63 As such, the court held that the Chicago Vehicle Fuel
Use Tax Ordinance did not violate the rights and privileges of the
airlines under the Agreement, and consequently reversed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. 64
The decision the court reached in United will have little application in general tax dispute resolutions. The decision rests solely
upon the court's interpretation of the provisions of an agreement
whereby Chicago limited its ability to make certain charges for the
use of O'Hare Airport. At most, the decision will impact on future
contracts that may be negotiated between taxpayers and governmental bodies to limit fees or charges. In the future, taxpayers desiring to prevent the imposition of taxes related to their use of
159.
160.

Id.
Id. at 320, 507 N.E.2d at 861. The court also noted that section 15.03 of the

O'Hare Use Agreement obligates the airlines to "pay all taxes ... required by any governmental authority in connection with the operations or activities performed by it hereunder." Id.
161. Id. at 320-21, 507 N.E.2d at 862.
162. Id. The court rejected the plaintiffs' contention that the fourth sentence of section 304(b) intended to equate the meanings of the words "tax" and "charge." Id. at 321,
507 N.E.2d at 862. Although the sentence could be so interpreted, the court concluded
that this fourth sentence was added exclusively to show that the parties had contemplated
the possibility of some form of tax that would levy on airline passengers, but were unsure
about such a tax's legality. Id.
163. Id. The court also noted that because the airlines have been paying some city
taxes that they have never protested, they would be hard put to provide a rational or
consistent basis for distinguishing between those taxes and the taxes challenged in this
case. Id. at 322, 507 N.E.2d at 862-63.
164. Id. at 323, 507 N.E.2d at 863.
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governmental facilities will specifically so provide in their
agreements.
B. Sales Ratio Study Methodology and the Calculation of Cook
County Multipliers
The Illinois Constitution mandates that taxes on real property
be imposed in a uniform manner based on valuation. 165 Recognizing the reality that assessment levels vary, the Illinois legislature
developed the concept of equalizing assessments. 166 Equalization is
performed county by county, in order that each county's assessed
value of its real property is equivalent to one-third of that property's fair cash value. 167 The legislature granted to the Department
of Revenue (the "Department") the dubious task of implementing
and carrying out this system of equalization.16 In performing this
task, the Department was given some guidance by section 146 of
the 1939 Revenue Act, which loosely sets forth the procedures for
the Department to calculate an equalization factor or "multiplier"
for each individual county. 169 Section 146 requires the Department
to compare assessed values of properties in a county to the fair
cash value of those same properties. 170 This procedure produces a
fraction or a ratio between the assessed values, established through
analysis of property transfers, appraisals, or other means, and the
fair cash value. 17 1 The Department then divides the numerator by
the denominator to obtain the median level of assessment for the
property in that county. That number (the median level of assessment) must then
be divided into 33 1/3 to obtain the multiplier for
172
county.
that
Section 1(20) of the 1939 Revenue Act attempted to clarify the
method for reaching this median level of assessment by creating
the procedure known as the "sales ratio study." 173 The sales ratio
study is a system whereby the Department averages the assessment
level for the three prior years and determines the median level of
assessment for the present year. 74 Additionally, section 1(20) mandates that the Department, after arriving at this figure, must "take
165. ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 4(a).
166. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, para. 627 (1985).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at para. 482(20).
174. Id. For example, 1979 assessments are compared to 1980 sales, 1980 assess-
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into account any changes in assessment levels implemented since
the data for such studies was collected."' - The Department must
exclude also from the fair cash value or sales price any amounts
included for personal property transferred during the sale as well
as excluding any type of "sales finance charge."' 176 Each person's
assessed value is then multiplied by this equalization factor or
multiplier. 177
In Airey v. The Department of Revenue,17 8 the Illinois Supreme
Court struck down a taxpayer's challenge to this procedure for calculating multipliers for the equalization of Cook County's real estate tax assessments.' 7 9 The plaintiffs in Airey contended that the
Department should use "final" revised assessments for the current
tax year instead of using "old or imaginary assessments."'8s The
plaintiffs argued that the relevant statutory provisions mandated
this procedure.' 8 ' The plaintiffs alleged that the Department's use
ments to 1981 sales, and 1981 assessments to 1982 sales. The average of these three
fractions is the median level of assessment. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. An example may help to clarify the process.
1980
1981
1982
1983
Line #1
ASSESSED
$100
$125
$150
$160
VALUES
Line #2
SALES
$400
$450
$500
$PRICES
Line #3

LEVEL OF
ASSESSMENT

25%

27.7%

30%

27.6%

The Department divides line I by line 2 to get averages for each year, line 3. The Department then takes the average of these three percentages for 1980, 1981, and 1982 to obtain
the average median level of assessment for 1983 (27.6%). The Department then adjusts
this median level of assessment by application of an adjustment factor which takes into
account changes in assessment levels made since the year of the assessments. It is this
average of 27.6% which is divided into 33 1/2% to obtain the multiplier for 1983. Note,
the denominator, which represents the sales price, is really the sales price for the subsequent year, i.e., the Department compares the 1980 assessed values against 1981 sales
prices. Airey v. The Dep't of Revenue, 116 Il.2d 528, 534-35, 508 N.E.2d 1058, 1061.
177. Airey, 116 Ill.
2d at 533-37, 508 N.E.2d at 1060-62.
178. 116 Il.2d 528, 508 N.E.2d 1058 (1987).
179. Id. at 536, 508 N.E.2d at 1062.
180. Id. Applying this to the visual example, supra note 176, the plaintiffs contended
that the most current 1983 assessed value ($160) should be used in determining 1983's
multiplier. Id. at 535-36, 508 N.E.2d at 1062. The plaintiffs alleged the use, by the Department, of the previous three year's assessment values resulted in a lower average median level, and as a direct consequence, a higher multiplier. Id. at 536, 508 N.E.2d at
1062.
181. Id. at 535, 508 N.E.2d at 1061. The plaintiffs referred to section 146 of the
Revenue Act of 1939, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, para. 627 (1985), which requires that the
Department "use in its sales ratio studies only [those] assessments as revised by ...[the]
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of the previous three year's assessments resulted in a lower average
18 2
median level, and as a direct consequence, a higher multiplier.
On administrative review, the circuit court of Cook County upheld
the Department's procedure for calculating the multipliers.' 3 The
plaintiffs appealed that judgment directly to the Illinois Supreme
Court. 84

The main issue before the supreme court was whether the Department's methodology for calculating the multipliers for Cook
County violated the uniformity provision of the Illinois Constitution.Is The court disagreed with the plaintiffs' interpretation of the
relevant6 statutory provisions and upheld the judgment of the lower
8
court.

The court began its analysis by relying on the long standing rule
that courts should give great "deference to the interpretation
placed on a statute by the agency charged with its administration
and enforcement."'' 8 7 Furthermore, the court observed that the
statutes involved were unclear and capable of several reasonable
interpretations. 88 Specifically, the court noted that none of the relevant provisions cited by the plaintiffs clearly specified what threeyear period is to be used in deriving these multipliers.'8 9 The court
stressed that the language used in the Real Estate Tax Act'9' supported the Department's position that it could use previous years'
assessments in calculating the multipliers.' 19
Next, the court examined the language of section 1(20) of the
board of appeals." Id. The plaintiffs also looked to the language of section 1(20) of the
1939 Revenue Act, which provides in relevant part "that the level of assessment determined by the sales ratio studies must be adjusted to take into account any changes in
assessment levels since the data for such studies were collected." Id. (quoting ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 120, para. 482).

182. Airey, 116 Ill. 2d at 535, 508 N.E.2d at 1062.
183. Id. at 532, 508 N.E.2d at 1060.
184. Id.
185. Id. See ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 4(a).
186. Airey, 116 I11.2d at 545, 508 N.E.2d at 1066.
187. Id. at 536, 508 N.E.2d at 1062 (citing Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood,
441 U.S. 91,107 (1979); Illinois Consol. Tel. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm., 95 Ill. 2d
142, 152, 447 N.E.2d 295, 300 (1983)).
188. Id. at 539, 508 N.E.2d at 1063.
189. Id. at 536, 508 N.E.2d at 1062.
190. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, paras. 1001 to 1008 (1985).

191. Airey, 116 Ill. 2d at 536-37, 508 N.E.2d at 1062. Section 3 of the Real Estate
Transfer Tax Act requires the filing of an information sheet ("green sheet") whenever a
transfer of real property takes place. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, para. 1003. These "green
sheets" provide information on the type of conveyance used, creative financing that might
have been used, parties to the transfer, value of personal property sold with the real
estate, etc. Airey, 116 11. 2d at 536-37, 508 N.E.2d at 1062. These green sheets provide a
main source of information used in the sales ratio studies. Id.
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1939 Revenue Act, which required the Department to account for
any changes in assessment levels implemented since the data for
the studies were collected. The court found that this language supported the Department's argument. 92 The court reasoned that the
clear language of the statute anticipated that the data used in the
studies would need adjustment. 193 Further, this section merely required the Department to adjust assessment levels rather than calculate new assessments as the plaintiffs contended. 94 The court
also stated that to adopt the plaintiffs' interpretation and to implement their methodology would greatly delay the calculation of
each year's multiplier and create confusion over parcels of land
whose classifications had changed. 95 The court concluded, therefore, that the Department correctly and reasonably interpreted the
relevant statutes. 196 Thus, the court affirmed the lower court and
upheld the validity of the sales ratio study methodology employed
by the Department. 97
The development of multipliers is a critical step in the taxation
of real property. Its avowed purpose is to insure uniformity from
county to county by adjusting assessments so that assessed value is
192. Airey, 116 11. 2d at 536-37, 508 N.E.2d at 1062.
193. Id. at 537-38, 508 N.E.2d at 1062-63.
194. Id. at 538, 508 N.E.2d at 1063.
195. Id. at 539, 508 N.E.2d at 1063. Cook County further classifies property into
different categories for tax purposes, each category having a different level of assessment.
Id. at 532-33, 508 N.E.2d at 1060.
196. Id. at 539, 508 N.E.2d at 1063.
197. Id. at 545, 508 N.E.2d at 1066. The plaintit challei:3ed the Department's methods on several other grounds which were all summarily disposed by the court. First, the
court held that section 146 does not mandate that the use of property appraisals as well as
property transfers be used in ascertaining the median level of assessment. Id. at 539-40,
508 N.E.2d at 1063. Section 146 requires the Department to use analysis of property
transfers, property appraisals, and such other means as it deems proper and reasonable to
obtain the median level of assessment. The court deemed the statutory provision to be
simply directory and therefore the direction to use property appraisals was merely a
guideline, not a mandatory requirement. Id. at 540, 508 N.E.2d at 1064.
Secondly, the court held that there was no evidence presented, nor any "clear legislative mandate" that required the retroactive application of the 1984 amendment to the
Real Estate Transfer Tax Act compelling the Department to take into account creative
financing when performing its sales ratio studies. Id. at 541, 508 N.E.2d at 1064. Therefore, the fact that the Department had not done so for the years of 1981, 1982, and 1983
did not invalidate the methodology used by the Department. Id.
Thirdly, the court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the Department should not rely
solely on the green sheets as its source for full value of personal property transferred with
the real estate. Id. at 541-42, 508 N.E.2d at 1604-65. See supra note 155. The court held
that because the real estate transfer tax is imposed on the value of the real estate transferred, the taxpayer would only be hurting himself by not reporting accurate information
on these green sheets. In addition, falsifying information on these green sheets is a Class
B misdemeanor. Id. at 542, 508 N.E.2d at 1065.
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one-third of fair cash value. The development of the multiplier,
however, is not an exact science. The Department of Revenue uses
assessed values for the prior two, three, and four years, and sales
data for the prior three years to develop the sales ratio studies upon
which the multiplier is based. Even though adjustments are made
for revisions to the assessments, this does not account for general
increases in assessments. Thus, if a multiplier is based on lower
assessed values in prior years, but the assessment level is actually
increasing, the multiplier will be too high, resulting in an assessment level higher than 33 1/3%.198 Nevertheless, the court sustained the method used by the Department, thus endorsing a
system which, in an economy of rising values, will result in levels
of assessment in excess of 33 1/3%.
Also of interest is the court's use of the administration burden
argument to hold against the plaintiffs. The court concluded that
to use current assessments would unduly delay the calculation of
the multiplier, and, therefore, the issuance of tax bills. Taxes, however, are paid one year in arrears: 1983 taxes, based on January 1,
1983 assessed values, are billed and paid in 1984. It would seem no
more burdensome to compare the 1983 assessments to 1981
through 1983 sales than to compare 1979, 1980, and 1981 assessments to those same sales.
Finding that the approach adopted by the Department for developing the multipliers was justified by the statute, the court refused
to engage in any speculation about whether an alternative system
would be more equitable. Thus, any relief from the apparent inequities of the current system must be cured through the legislative
process.
C.

Chicago Amusement Tax Ordinance

The Chicago Amusement Tax Ordinance 99 imposes a tax for
the privilege of participating in, or witnessing, amusements within
the city limits. 21 Owners, operators, and managers of these
amusements collect the tax which is levied at four percent of the
admission fee for the amusement. 20' The tax applies only to
amusements within the limits of the city of Chicago and does not
198. See supra note 167. Assume that for 1983 the assessor assesses property at 33 1/
3% of fair cash value. Nevertheless, the multiplier will be approximately 1.22 (33 1/3/
27.3), so the actual level of assessment is 40.65% (33 1/3 actual level multiplied by 1.22
multiplier).
199. Chicago Municipal Code, § 104-1 (1984).

200. Id.
201.

Id. § 104-2A (1984) Chicago Department of Revenue Ruling No. 86-1.
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apply to any portion of an amusement that extends outside the
city. 20 2 Further, the tax does not apply to the right to participate
in non-amusement activities within the city. 203
In 1985, the Chicago City Council amended the Chicago
Amusement Tax Ordinance to include "any entertainment or recreational activity offered for public participation or on a membership or other basis. ' 20 4 The amendment attempted to clarify the
definition of amusement by listing examples
including among other
20 5
things "racquetball and health clubs.$
In Chicago Health Clubs v. Picur,2° the Illinois Appellate Court
for the First District dealt a blow to the opponents of the so-called
"Yuppie Tax" by upholding the 1985 amendment to the Chicago
Amusement Tax Ordinance.20 7 The plaintiffs in Picur, owners of
various Chicago health and racquetball clubs, filed their complaint
in the circuit court seeking a declaration that the amendment was
unconstitutional, because it was, inter alia, vague, created an occupation tax, created unreasonable classifications, and violated the
constitutional prohibition against special legislation. 208 Also, the
plaintiffs sought to enjoin the defendants from enforcing the tax. 2° 9
The circuit court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss and the
defendants appealed.210
The appellate court held that the amendment was constitutional
and reversed the decision of the circuit court.2 11 On appeal, the
plaintiffs presented two arguments. First, plaintiffs argued that the
amendment created an impermissible occupation tax on the privilege of providing health or racquetball club services.212 The court

rejected this argument noting that Article VII, section 6(e) of the
1970 Illinois Constitution provides that a home rule unit, 213 such
as Chicago, shall have the power to impose taxes on income, earn202. Id. at § 104-2A (1984).
203. Id.
204. Id. at § 104-1(2).
205. Id.
206. 155 Il1. App. 3d 482, 508 N.E.2d 742 (1st Dist. 1987).
207. Id. at 488, 508 N.E.2d at 746.
208. Id. at 486, 508 N.E.2d at 745.
209. Id. The defendants included various city officials including the comptroller,
treasurer, and director of revenue as well as the city itself. Id at 485, 508 N.E.2d at 744.
210. Id. at 486-87, 508 N.E.2d at 745.
211. Id. at 488, 508 N.E.2d at 746.

212. Id.
213. "A Home Rule Unit ("HRU") is either a municipality consisting of a population of twenty-five thousand or more individuals or a municipality that has elected to be a

HRU through initiative and referendum." 18 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 787 (1986) See ILL.
CONST. art. VII, § 6(a).
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ings, or occupations only to the extent that the General Assembly
may provide. 21 4 Moreover, the legislature, through section 11-42-5
of the municipal code, authorizes any municipality to tax amusements. 2 1 Therefore, as long as the General Assembly authorizes
the tax, it does not matter ihat such a tax, once imposed, is an
occupation tax.21 6 Thus, the court held that the amendment
in
217
question did not create an unconstitutional occupation tax.
Next, the plaintiffs argued that the amendment was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. 21" The plaintiffs set forth a myriad
of reasons why terms in the amendment were impermissibly
vague. 2 The court rejected this argument by stating that great
deference must be afforded to the legislative definitions given to a
particular statute. 220 A statute will be held void for vagueness only
if it is so unclear and ambiguous that an ordinarily reasonable per221
son would have to guess at its meaning or on how to apply it.
The court applied these general principles to the facts in the instant
case, and held that the statute sufficiently defined its terms and was
not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad.222 Accordingly, the
214. Picur, 155 Ill. App. 3d at 488, 508 N.E.2d at 746.
215. Id. at 489, 508 N.E.2d at 747.
216. Id. (citing Wellington v. City of Chicago, 144 Il. App. 3d 774, 780-82, 494
N.E.2d 603, 608-09 (1st Dist. 1986), appeal denied, 112 Ill. 2d 598, - N.E.2d - (1986);
Isberian v. The Village of Gurnee, 116 Ill. App. 3d 146, 150, 452 N.E.2d 10, 13-14 (1st
Dist. 1983), appeal denied, 96 I1. 2d 542 (1983)).
217. Picur, 155 Ill. App. 3d at 488, 508 N.E.2d at 746. The court rejected also the
plaintiffs' argument that utilizing the facilities of a health or racquetball club is not an
amusement but rather a difficult, painstaking process. Id. at 489, 508 N.E.2d at 747. The
court held that amusements include "participatory as well as exhibitory entertainment."
Id. at 490, 508 N.E.2d at 747. Furthermore, the Illinois Supreme Court has already held
a tennis club to be an amusement, and health and racquetball clubs were not substantially different from tennis clubs. Id. (citing Greater Chicago Indoor Tennis Clubs, Inc. v.
Village of Willowbrook, 63 Ill. 2d 400, 406, 349 N.E.2d 3, 7 (1975)).
218. Picur, 155 Ill. App. 3d at 490, 508 N.E.2d at 748.
219. Id. The plaintiffs claimed that the amendment inadequately defined the terms
"amusement" and "recreational activity," and that it also failed to provide sufficient
guidelines for the collection and remittance of the tax. Id. at 491, 508 N.E.2d at 748.
220. Id. at 491, 508 N.E.2d at 748 (citing Heerey v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 82 Il.
App. 3d 1088, 1092, 403 N.E.2d 617, 620 (Dist. 1980)).
221. Id. (citing S. Bloom, Inc. v. Korshak, 52 Ill. 2d 56, 64, 284 N.E.2d 257, 262
(1972)).
222. Picur, 155 Ill. App. 3d at 492, 508 N.E,2d at 749. The plaintiffs also challenged
certain exemptions contained in the amendment that were granted to "religious, educational and charitable institutions, organizations conducted for the sole purpose of maintaining a symphony orchestra" and organizations maintained for "civic improvement,"
as violating the equal protection clause of the Illinois Constitution. Id. The court upheld
this exemptions on the grounds that the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proof to
show that there was no reasonable justification for the division of the classifications. Id. at
493-94, 508 N.E.2d at 749-50.
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court upheld the 1985 amendment to the Chicago Amusement Tax
Ordinance as constitutional, thus concluding that the defendants'
motion to dismiss should have been granted.223
The court's decision in Picur is of interest because it sustained a
home rule unit tax against the challenge that it is an unauthorized
occupation tax by finding legislative authority for it. As an Illinois
municipality's needs for revenue increases, it may seek to impose
taxes on specific transactions or situations, such as health club
memberships, to provide the revenue without imposing a tax burden on the populace as a whole. Because of the limitation on home
rule authority and the uniformity requirement of the Illinois Constitution, challenges to these ordinances should be expected. One
argument to defeat these special tax provisions, that the tax is an
occupation tax, was defeated in Picur based upon state law provisions in the municipal code that specifically authorize municipalities to impose amusement taxes. If similar authorizing language
can be found in other portions of the Illinois Revised Statutes,
more of these special taxes may be sustained.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The decisions reviewed during the Survey period did not result
in any unusual or unexpected results. As with the cases in the
prior Survey period, the majority were decided in favor of taxation,
again indicating the significant burden that taxpayers must sustain
to defeat a tax.

223. Id. at 495, 508 N.E.J at 751. Note, Justice McMorrow wrote an extremely
strong dissent in this case. McMorrow contended, among other things, that this amendment did indeed create it service or occupation tax. Id.

